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FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-REX v. CIA. PERVANA
DE VAPORES, S.A.
Plaintiff, a longshoreman who was injured while working aboard
defendant's vessel, brought suit in United States District Court
for damages under section 5(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.1 The plaintiff demanded a jury trial
and alleged diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.' The defen-
dant vessel owner is a corporation owned entirely by a foreign
sovereign, the State of Peru. Defendant moved to strike plaintiffs
demand for a jury trial, alleging that jurisdiction against a foreign
sovereign can be exercised only pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1330(a),
which provides for nonjury trials.' The district court, finding both
diversity and federal question jurisdiction, denied defendant's mo-
tion to strike but certified the question for interlocutory appeal."
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that: 1) the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (F.S.I.A.) precludes the right to jury
' Section 5(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides
in relevant part:
(b) In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person . .. may bring an action against such
vessel as a third party ....
33 U.S.C. S 905(b) (1976).
Prior to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, S 1332 read in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of in-
terest and costs, and is between-(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof ....
The F.S.I.A. changed subsection (a)(2) as follows:
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state . ...
28 U.S.C. S 1332 (1976).
28 U.S.C. S 1330(a) (1976) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount
in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect
to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections
1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
Id.
28 U.S.C. S 1603 (1976) provides in relevant part:
For purposes of this chapter-
(a) A 'foreign state', . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' means an entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state ... a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state . . ..
Id.
, Rex v. CIA. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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trial in an action against a corporation of which the majority
stockholder is a foreign sovereign; and 2) because the action is
not a suit at common law, this preclusion does not offend the
seventh amendment.5
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals first faced the
determination of whether section 1330(a) of the F.S.I.A. affords
the exclusive jurisdictional mechanism for actions in United States
courts by United States citizens against foreign sovereigns.' Find-
ing section 1330(a) to be the sole basis for jurisdiction, the court
then was compelled to determine whether the F.S.I.A. requirement
that these cases be heard without a jury violates the right to jury
trial in "suits at common law" guaranteed by the seventh
amendment.7
The F.S.I.A. was enacted in 1976. Prior to that time, the State
Department policy followed a restrictive principle of foreign
sovereign immunity.8 Restrictive immunity recognizes the immunity
of a foreign sovereign to suits resulting from the public acts of
the State (jure imperii) but not to suits resulting from the private
or commercial acts of the State (jure gestionis).9 There were prob-
lems with the restrictive interpretation, however, primarily in that
the State Department often was forced to apply the principle in
cases already before the courts.1° Moreover, the Department en-
countered diplomatic pressures from governments that were sub-
ject to suit, and as a consequence the immunity question was not
always answered on a strictly legal basis.1
The F.S.I.A. was intended to determine "when and how . . . a
lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities" could be brought
in United States courts and the conditions under which the State
' Rex v. CIA. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Rex].
' Id. at 61, 62. Under the "saving to suitors" clause of The Judiciary Act of 1789, the
citizen could bring his suit in a state court. However, 28 U.S.C. S 1441 allows a suit brought
against a foreign state to be removed to a federal court where the case will be heard without
a jury.
' Id. at 62.
' The "Tate Letter" advised Attorney General Philip B. Perlman that the State Depart-
ment was abandoning the "absolute theory of sovereign immunity" in favor of the newer
restrictive theory. Letter from Jack B. Tate to Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted
in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
' H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 1487].
10 Id. at 6607. In practice, after an action was filed in district court, the foreign state
would request immunity from the State Department, which would then advise the Attorney
General's Office and the court of the Department's decision. See also 26 DEPT STATE BULL.
984 (1952).
" H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 9, at 6606.
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would be immune. 2 It codified the restrictive principle of foreign
sovereign immunity'3 and gave a statutory basis for jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign.
Several district courts have found diversity jurisdiction suffi-
cient to bring a foreign sovereign into United States courts, and
have granted plaintiffs' demands for jury trial." Only two circuit
courts have considered the jurisdictional question presented in the
principal case. Both the Second and Fourth Circuits found sections
1330(a) and 1441(d)' 5 to be the exclusive bases of jurisdiction in
actions against foreign sovereigns.'" To date, no plaintiff has sought
certiorari on this aspect of the F.S.I.A.; thus the Supreme Court
has not yet heard the issues involved in this case."
The Second Circuit's extensive treatment of the jurisdictional
provisions of the F.S.I.A. in Ruggiero v. Companhia Pervana de
Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui" 8 has become the model for inter-
pretation of this issue and was followed carefully by both the Fourth
Circuit in Williams v. Shipping Corporation of India,'9 and the Third
Circuit in the principal case. Writing for the Ruggiero court, Judge
Friendly first compared the language of the federal courts' jurisdic-
tional grants prior to 1976 with the language of the F.S.I.A., which
removed from section 1332(a) the reference to suits by a citizen
against a foreign state.' The court rejected the plaintiffs argu-
ment that while the defendant is concededly a "foreign state" it
is also a "citizen or subject of a foreign state" and therefore sub-
ject to diversity jurisdiction, finding it anomalous that the same
entity could be both sovereign and subject." Judge Friendly found
no reason for Congress to prefer jury trials for federal statutory
" Id. at 6604.
13 Id.
" See Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980) (denying the mo-
tion to strike the jury trial demand because although a foreign sovereign, the defendant
corporation is also a "citizen or subject of a foreign state."); Lonon v. Companhia de
Navagacao Lloyd Basiliero, 85 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (any other interpretation would
violate the seventh amendment); Icenogle v. Olympia Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C.
1979) (the F.S.I.A. does not eliminate jurisdiction facially under S 1332(a)).
" Rex, supra note 5, at 61, 62.
The legislative history of the F.S.I.A. supports this view. See HR. Rep. No. 1487, supra
note 9, at 6611, 6612.
" In fact, search has failed to disclose any F.S.I.A. case that has reached the Supreme
Court.
639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981).
" 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981).
639 F.2d at 873-75.
1 Id. at 875. However, this argument has been persuasive in the trial courts. See supra
note 14.
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or constitutional questions but not for nonstatutory claims.
Therefore, he rejected the plaintiff's final argument that jurisdic-
tion and a jury trial can be reached under section 1331 federal
question jurisdiction.' Finally, the court focused on the legislative
history of the F.S.I.A. in support of its conclusions that sections
1330(a) and 1441(d) are the only bases of jurisdiction and that they
bar the right to jury trials.23
The Williams and Rex courts followed the analysis of Ruggiero
on the jurisdictional question,' from which the Rex court concluded
that "Congress intended all actions against foreign states to be
tried without a jury and to be brought under 28 U.S.C. S 1330(a).21
On the constitutional question, however, the Rex court departed
from the common reasoning.
The Ruggiero and Williams' opinions began their treatment of
the constitutional issue with the argument that the seventh amend-
ment guarantee of a jury trial "[in Suits at common law," does
not apply to suits against foreign states, because such a suit could
not have been brought in 1791 when the amendment was adopted.'
This argument is difficult to reconcile with the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Curtis v. Loether,28 in which Justice Mar-
shall refused to limit the seventh amendment to common law rights
that existed in 1791. Reitterating Justice Story's definition of "com-
mon law," which equated common law rights with "legal rights"
as distinguished from equitable or admiralty rights,9 the Curtis
Id. at 876. Congress did not alter 28 U.S.C. S 1331 as it had S 1332. See supra note
2. Therefore, actions against foreign states were not deleted from this statute. However,
the legislative history shows that jurisdiction under S 1332 is superfluous because S 1330
is regarded as a comprehensive basis of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. H.R. Rep.
No. 1487, supra note 9, at 6613.
639 F.2d at 877-78.
2 653 F.2d at 880-81, 660 F.2d at 62-63.
2 660 F.2d at 65.
" On the constitutional issue, the Williams opinion closely parallels Ruggiero in both
structure and language. Compare, for example, the first paragraph, second column of 653
F.2d at 881 with the first paragraph, second column of 639 F.2d at 879.
' 639 F.2d at 879 and 881, 653 F.2d at 881 and 883.
28 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
" Id. at 193 (quoting Persons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830)). See also
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974). It should be noted that the questions in-
volved in the principal case become moot if S 5(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act is construed as invoking admiralty as opposed to common law jurisdic-
tion. No jury trial rights attach to actions in admiralty. The Rex court did not discuss
whether this might be an admiralty claim. Ruggiero explicitly refused to decide whether
S 5(b) invokes admiralty or law jurisdiction. 639 F.2d at 876. However, the Fifth Circuit,
in Russell v. Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, 625 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980) decided that admir-
alty jurisdiction is invoked by S 5(b).
A • •
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Court held that for purposes of the seventh amendment, the
presence of "legal rights" determines the applicability of the right
to jury trial. 0 Justice Marshall stated that where an action for
damages sounding in tort is created by statute, "a jury trial must
be available."31 The Ruggiero and Williams courts, however,
distinguished Curtis by limiting its applicability to expansions in
domestic law where the proceedings are analogous to common law
actions in 1791.3" Those courts found that as foreign sovereigns
were not subject to suit when the seventh amendment was adopted,
there is now no common law right to jury trial in a suit against
a foreign sovereign.3
The second constitutional argument of the Ruggiero and Williams
courts proceeded by analogy to domestic sovereign immunity. The
Supreme Court frequently has held that when the United States
consents to be sued in its own courts, thereby waiving its immu-
nity, no right to jury trial attaches because no right to sue the
sovereign existed at common law.' Ruggiero and Williams extended
this analysis, maintaining that no right to jury trial exists when
a foreign sovereign is sued in United States courts as suits against
these sovereigns also were unknown at common law. 5
Writing for the Rex court, Judge Aldisert agreed that the F.S.I.A.
denial of jury trials is constitutionally permissible. He disagreed,
however, with the reasoning of the Ruggiero and Williams courts.'
The Rex court analysis began with a recognition of the presump-
tion of constitutionality of acts of Congress, a presumption that
is reinforced in this case in light of the importance of the F.S.I.A.
to foreign policy. Although all three courts agreed that the con-
stitutionality of section 1330(a) is determined by the interpreta-
tion of "suit at common law," the Rex court refused to "view com-
mon law as frozen in 1791."''
The court nevertheless rejected plaintiffs argument, based on
415 U.S. at 193.
Id. at 195.
639 F.2d at 881, 653 F.2d at 883.
3 Id.
" Cf., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 101 S. Ct. 2698 (1981); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530 (1962); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); McElrath v. United
States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880). However, in these cases "common law" seems to refer to the
common law as it existed in 1791 as opposed to Justice Story's definition noted in the
text accompanying note 28, supra. Cf. 319 U.S. at 388.
639 F.2d at 879-80, 653 F.2d at 882.
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Curtis, that the seventh amendment requires provision of a jury
trial in all damages actions. The proper inquiry, according to this
court, was "whether the action is in the nature of a legal remedy
similar to a suit at common law."39 The court responded to this
question first by reference to the long lines of cases 4 in which
the Supreme Court consistently has denied jury trials to plaintiffs
in actions against the United States unless the jury trial right was
clearly a part of "the legislation creating the cause of action."'"
The Court's reasoning stemmed from notions of sovereign immu-
nity: as the United States basically is immune from suit, when it
does consent to be sued in its own courts no common law right
to a jury trial accompanies the action even where money damages
are at issue.
The Rex court then examined the history of foreign sovereign
immunity. The first case cited by the court was The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFadden,' in which the Supreme Court held that foreign
war ships entering the ports of a friendly nation are presumed
exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts of the host country unless
the sovereign of that nation unambiguously rejects the
presumption. It was noted that this immunity was extended in
Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro'5 to include commercial ships
owned by foreign sovereigns. Judge Aldisert next referred to the
Supreme Court decision of Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,' in which
it was held that the judiciary should defer to the State Depart-
ment on questions of sovereign immunity. In that case, as the State
Department had not recognized the request by Mexico for immun-
ity, the Court denied it.47 The Rex court thus concluded that because
actions against foreign states existed only with the consent of the
State Department, these actions never existed at common law but
were instead a "unique species of public law, drawing deeply on
its origins in admiralty and international law .... 1,,
Finally, the court recognized that Congress actually transfer-
red an important aspect of foreign policy to the judiciary by enact-
" Id. at 67.
', See cases at note 34, supra.
4' 660 F.2d at 67 (quoting Lehman, 453 U.S. 156, 162 n.9, 101 S. Ct. at 2702.
,2 660 F.2d at 67.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
" Id. at 145-46.
'5 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
324 U.S. 30 (1945).
, Id. at 38.
660 F.2d at 68.
246 [Vol. 12:241
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
ing the F.S.I.A. 9 The opinion suggests that Congress excluded the
possibility of jury trial in these actions due to the fact that foreign
States unfamiliar with the jury system would be distrustful of
United States courts in which they would be faced with the uncer-
tainty of a jury trial." Ultimately, however, the court found that
because Congress could have withheld all authority for federal
courts to hear these cases, it should be able to determine the con-
ditions under which the cases are heard, especially where those
conditions effectuate legitimate foreign policy concerns."1
In dissent, Judge Sloviter agreed that the F.S.I.A. is the ex-
clusive jurisdictional mechanism for actions against foreign state-
owned corporations, but asserted that those portions of the F.S.I.A.
that deprive plaintiffs of a jury trial in damages actions against
state-owned foreign corporations are unconstitutional., His opinion
attacked the majority holding that the identity of the defendant
rather than the nature of the action should determine whether
common law rights are involved.' In his opinion, the applicable
question is whether a damages action sounding in tort falls into
the category of "'rights and remedies' . . . enforced at common
law."'
The analogy drawn by the majority between domestic sovereign
immunity and foreign sovereign immunity was particularly unper-
suasive to Judge Sloviter. He found authority for the former in
"constitutional, historical, and metaphysical principles," but as the
basis for foreign sovereign immunity, only notions of courtesy be-
tween nations. From this it followed that foreign immunity is
revocable at the will of the host country. 5  He argued that foreign
state-owned corporations historically were not accorded presump-
tive immunity, but rather courts generally refused to consider
ownership as relevant. 8 Moreover, he pointed to a line of cases
which hold that even domestic corporations are not automatically
" Id. at 68-69.
"' Id. at 69.
" Id. The right of Congress to grant or withdraw jurisdiction from the courts is beyond
dispute. U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, cl. 2. But see the discussion of the dissent's position in the
text accompanying notes 57 and 58, infra.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 70.
Id. (quoting Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 362, 375 (1974)).
660 F.2d at 71.
Id. at 72. Cf. United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.
1929); Coale v. Societe Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
19821
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immune merely because the United States is an owner or
stockholder. 7
Turning to the presumptive constitutionality of acts of Congress
on which the majority relied, the dissent argued that although Con-
gress could withhold jurisdiction from the federal courts in these
cases, once jurisdiction was granted it could not be conditioned
on the denial of constitutional rights.5 While Judge Sloviter agreed
that deference must be paid congressional actions, he stated,
"[nionetheless, [it is] the responsibility of the judiciary to deter-
mine when Congress has exceeded the permissible scope of its
powers.... ."' Accordingly, the constitutionality of the enactment
was questioned by the assertion that the F.S.I.A. goes beyond the
primary purposes of the Act: its overly broad definition of "foreign
states" "collide[s] with the fundamental interest in providing jury
trials in civil cases."' Thus, the conclusion of the dissent was that
the provision limiting jurisdiction to nonjury trials should be
severed from the Act."
It is clear that the circuit courts were correct in holding that
under the F.S.I.A. a jury trial cannot be granted in an action against
a corporation owned by a foreign sovereign. These decisions were
required by the Act itself and the clear intention of Congress ex-
pressed in its legislative history.' It is not as clear that the F.S.I.A.
denial of jury trial rights can be reconciled with the seventh amend-
ment. As the Rex dissent points out, the relevant case law points
to the "rights and remedies" rather than the nature of the parties
to determine whether the right to jury trial attaches.6
These three cases leave unexplored the question of fairness. A
United States citizen cannot exercise the right to jury trial in an ac-
tion against a foreign sovereign." However, under some cir-
cumstances, the foreign sovereign may consent to jury trial if it
is advantageous to the foreign state. 5 In addition, a foreign
sovereign plaintiff may demand a jury trial in a suit against a
", 660 F.2d at 73. Cf. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549
(1922); United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491 (1922); Bank of the United States v. Planters'
Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).




62 See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 9, at 6613.
660 F.2d at 70.
Id. at 65, 639 F.2d at 878.
Where the action is brought in a State court, it may be tried before a jury. Only the
foreign sovereign has the right to remove it to a federal court. See supra note 6.
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United States citizen.' It is difficult to understand why Congress
should give any profit-making corporation, regardless of sovereign
ownership, the tactical advantage afforded by the singular right
to choose whether to submit a case to a jury. This is especially
so when that advantage is given by arguably withdrawing a consti-
tutional guarantee.
Finally, the F.S.I.A. definition of "foreign states" should be con-
sidered over-inclusive, 7 as it not only protects corporations wholly
owned by foreign governments, but shields minority nonsovereign
stockholders from this cost of doing business. It is to be argued
that the jury trial right extended by the seventh amendment should
not be limited by foreign policy considerations when the defen-
dant "foreign state" is a profit-making corporation.
Richard 0. Ward
28 U.S.C. S 1332(aX4) provides that a foreign state may sue a U.S. citizen under
diversity jurisdiction, which provides for jury trial.
" See supra note 3.
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